Systems and methods for post-hoc device registration

ABSTRACT

A method for managing a post-hoc device registration in an ecosystem is provided. The method includes assembling an electronic device, having a system on a chip (SoC) integrated therein. The method further includes activating/onboarding the device, receiving, by a CA from the device, a communication containing at least one keypair, validating, from the CA to the device, the at least one keypair, triggering, by the CA, data capture of validation data. The validation data includes user registration data, and manufacture/status data for least one of the device and the SoC. The captured validation data is stored in a database of the CA, and then aggregated, along with the received at least one keypair, from the CA database into a billing invoice to the device assembler. The registration data is referenced to the at least one keypair and other validation data by the CA.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. ProvisionalPatent Application Ser. No. 62/408,567, filed Oct. 14, 2016, which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The field of the disclosure relates generally to management of deviceregistration, and more particularly, to management of public and privatekeys and/or certificates through an ecosystems.

Many conventional electronic devices utilize a Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) to validate an electronic signature of the device in a variety oftechnology fields, such as telecommunications (e.g., mobilecommunication devices), the Internet of Things (IoT), online banking,secure email, and e-commerce. PKI uses a pair of cryptographic keys(e.g., one public and one private) to encrypt and decrypt data. PKIutilization enables, for example, devices to obtain and renew X.509certificates, which are used to establish trust between devices andencrypt communications using such protocols as Transport Layer Security(TLS), etc. A PKI includes policies and procedures for encrypting publickeys, as well as the creation, management, distribution, usage, storage,and revocation of digital certificates. The PKI binds the public keys tothe identity of a person or legal entity, typically through a trustedCertificate Authority (CA). The PKI hierarchy identifies a chain oftrust for a device or program, and further may provide secure softwaredownload requirements for the devices, and/or secure certificateinjection requirements on the device manufacturers. The CA, theelectronic devices, the device manufacturers, and users of the deviceinteract over a PKI ecosystem.

In conventional PKI ecosystems, however the management of keys, as wellas the process of inserting keys into the devices, is problematic,expensive, and difficult to audit. Due to these difficulties, devicemanufacturers that utilize PKI are today required to add PKI costs tothe bill of materials of each device at the time of manufacture,irrespective of whether the device may be eventually sold to/activatedby a consumer. The security benefits provided to the device areconsidered to outweigh the risk of purchasing a PKI keypair that mightnot be sold. The PKI security is required to meet compliance guidelines,by regulatory bodies in industry, for the particular ecosystemrequirements, for market purposes. Nevertheless, the risk of notrecouping the PKI bill of materials investment, which is oftencompounded by the inability of the device manufacturers to charge apremium for the added security, has been an obstacle to the utilizationof PKY by many industries.

Furthermore, many conventional IoT devices may be deployed in more thanone existing ecosystem (e.g., Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF),AllSeen/AllJoyn, Nest/Thread, Zigbee, etc.), and a different key isinserted on such devices for each ecosystem into which deployment isdesired. The manufacturers of such conventional devices must add to thePKI bill of materials the cost for each such inserted keypair, even ifthe device may never be activated in more than one (or any) of thecorresponding ecosystems. Thus, some IoT devices are manufactured to bedeployable only within particular ecosystems. Accordingly, it isdesirable to have a PKI management system that enables devicemanufacturers to audit which inserted keypairs are actually beingactivated by a consumer, and to be invoiced only for registrationsand/or certificates that have actually been issued by an ecosystem CA.

BRIEF SUMMARY

In an aspect, a method is provided for managing a post-hoc deviceregistration in an ecosystem in which the device is deployed. The methodincludes a step of assembling an electronic device. The device has asystem on a chip (SoC) integrated therein. The method further includesactivating or onboarding the device, receiving, by a CA from the device,a communication containing at least one keypair, validating, from the CAto the device, the at least one keypair, triggering, by the CA, datacapture of validation data, the validation data including userregistration data, and data relevant to the manufacture and status of atleast one of the device and the SoC, storing the captured validationdata in a database of the CA, and aggregating the stored validationdata, along with the received at least one keypair, from the CA databaseinto a billing invoice to the device assembler. The registration data isreferenced to the at least one keypair and other validation data by theCA.

In another aspect, an ecosystem for managing a public key infrastructurePKI is provided. The ecosystem includes a manufacturer system configuredto integrate a system on a chip (SoC) into an electronic device, anassembled electronic device having at least one integrated SoC, and atleast one PKI keypair encoded on the SoC, and a certificate authority CAserver system in operable communication with a computer system of themanufacturer system and the assembled electronic device. The certificateauthority server system is configured to (i) validate the at least onekeypair, and (ii) store captured data related to one or more of deviceregistration, device manufacture, device status, SoC status, and SoCregistration.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

These and other features, aspects, and advantages of the presentdisclosure will become better understood when the following detaileddescription is read with reference to the accompanying drawings in whichlike characters represent like parts throughout the drawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a keypair generation process,according to an embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of a keypair generation process,according to an alternative embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of registration ecosystem forimplementing the embodiments depicted in FIGS. 1 and 2.

Unless otherwise indicated, the drawings provided herein are meant toillustrate features of embodiments of this disclosure. These featuresare believed to be applicable in a wide variety of systems including oneor more embodiments of this disclosure. As such, the drawings are notmeant to include all conventional features known by those of ordinaryskill in the art to be required for the practice of the embodimentsdisclosed herein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following specification and claims, reference will be made to anumber of terms, which shall be defined to have the following meanings.

The singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” include plural references unlessthe context clearly dictates otherwise.

“Optional” or “optionally” means that the subsequently described eventor circumstance may or may not occur, and that the description includesinstances where the event occurs and instances where it does not.

As used further herein, “CA” may refer to a certificate authorityhosting a root certificate, and may further include, without limitation,one or more of a CA computer system, a CA server, a CA webpage, and a CAweb service.

Approximating language, as used herein throughout the specification andclaims, may be applied to modify any quantitative representation thatcould permissibly vary without resulting in a change in the basicfunction to which it is related. Accordingly, a value modified by a termor terms, such as “about,” “approximately,” and “substantially,” are notto be limited to the precise value specified. In at least someinstances, the approximating language may correspond to the precision ofan instrument for measuring the value. Here and throughout thespecification and claims, range limitations may be combined and/orinterchanged; such ranges are identified and include all the sub-rangescontained therein unless context or language indicates otherwise.

The embodiments described herein provide systems and methods formodifying a PKI validation process to also verify the status of a deviceduring device registration validation of certificate chains. In anexemplary embodiment, a device is monitored as it transitions, duringregistration, from a “not in use” or “invalid” state to a state wherethe device is both “in use” and “valid.” An appropriately manufactureddevice may be, for example, “valid,” but not “in use” (e.g., activatedby a consumer) prior to sale from the manufacturer to the consumer.According to these advantageous techniques, registration, billing, andecosystem selection may be more reliably performed for a PKI deviceafter the device has been purchased. That is, the present systems andmethods implement a verifiable post-hoc decision process, whichsignificantly improves over conventional manufacturing processes, whichrequire a priori guesswork.

In an exemplary embodiment, the present systems and methods utilize anX.509 trust model, in which a trusted third party CA is responsible forsigning digital certificates. Accordingly, as described herein, the CAis presumed to have capability to store one or more trusted rootcertificates (or intermediate certificates) as well as the correspondingprivate keys. The CA is further responsible for maintaining up-to-daterevocation information regarding the validity of issued certificates,and will provide information to the other parties, for example, throughan Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). In some embodiments, theCA may provide information according to a Certificate Revocation List(CRL). The OCSP is an Internet protocol for obtaining a revocationstatus of an X.509 digital certificate, and is generally considered analternative to the CRL. OCSP messages may be communicated, for example,by Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) encoding over the HypertextTransfer Protocol (HTTP), from and to OCSP responders of the CA server(or OCSP server).

In exemplary operation, the CA issues PKI certificates and public keysto the ecosystem members. The CA receives OCSP request messages from theecosystem members and confirms the revocation status of a correspondingcertificate (e.g., stored in the trusted database of the CA), and theOCSP responder of the CA transmits an OCSP response message indicatingthe revocation status (e.g., “valid,” “revoked,” “unknown,” etc., or anerror message if the request message may not be processed). The presentsystems and methods improve upon conventional CA operation by providinga data capture trigger capability or mechanism to the OCSP responder,and an aggregation capability/mechanism to the database. In someembodiments, these additional elements are further coupled with aCustomer Relationship Management (CRM) unit of the CA.

In the exemplary embodiment, the CA generates or records the issuance ofthe public/private keypairs. In some embodiments, the CA furtheroptionally generates/records the certificates associated with thekeypairs. Whereas, in conventional systems, the CA charges a devicemanufacturer up-front for the keypair issuance operation, in theexemplary embodiment such up-front payments are advantageouslyadjustable to a particular arrangement between, for example, the devicemanufacturer and the CA. That is, up-front charges/payments may be, atthe time of key creation, full, partial, or none. In some embodiments,the created keys constitute a single keypair. In other embodiments, thecreated keys are multiple keypairs for different ecosystems.

In the exemplary embodiment, the keypair(s), as well as the optionalcertificates, is(are) to inserted or generated on a System on a Chip(SoC) prior to any secondary inclusion of the SoC into a manufactureddevice, that is, at the time of SoC manufacture. For example, a devicemanufacturer or integrator may purchase a previously-manufactured SoC,and integrate the secure element thereof (e.g., along with theassociated credentials) in the final design of the finished device.Subsequently, when the device is purchased (e.g., by a consumer), itspackaging removed, and installed within an ecosystem network, the PKIprotocol for the device will validate the keys and, optionally, theassociated certificate(s).

In exemplary operation, during the validation process of the PKIprotocol, a specially-formatted message is transmitted to the OCSPresponder. The OCSP responder may then trigger, at the time of deviceregistration, an entry in a certificate database of the CA to captureparticular status information of the device, including withoutlimitation, data for the date/time of registration, a serial numberdevice, the device batch number, SoC batch numbers, and SoCmanufacturing date. In some operations, this data capturing mechanismmay further trigger, during the registration process, the capture ofconsumer/user information, such as name, address, contact information,etc. In an exemplary embodiment, this additional captured data isaggregated and entered into a table of the CA database. In someembodiments, and aggregation mechanism further registers whether thedevice activation has met a predetermined threshold for minimum numberof device registrations. The collected activation data may then befurther aggregated into a billing system (e.g., the CRM) so that aninvoice may be created to transmit to the device manufacturer forpayment of the actual number of device activations/registrations.

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a keypair generation process 100.Process 100 is implemented with respect to a CA 102, which generates oneor more keypairs 104 for transfer to a component fabricator 106 forinsertion/installation on an SoC 108. In exemplary operation, process100 begins at step S110, in which CA 102 generates one or more keypairs104. In at least one example of step S110, CA 102 further generatescorresponding certificates (e.g., X.509 certificates) associated withgenerated keypair(s) 104. In step S112, CA 102 transfers keypair(s) 104to component fabricator 106. In step S114, component fabricator 106inserts keypair(s) 104 into SoC 108. In at least one example of stepS114, along with the insertion of keypair(s) 104, SoC 108 furtherincludes encoded identification data particular to SoC 108, includingone or more of the batch numbers, the manufacturing date, andidentifying information for component fabricator 106. In a furtherexample of step S114, SoC 108 further includes encoded status data,e.g., “inactive,” “integrated,” “activated,” “recycled,” etc.

FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of a keypair generation process 200.Process 200 is similar to process 100, FIG. 1, in that process 200 isimplemented with respect to a CA 202, which generates one or morekeypairs 204 for transfer to a component fabricator 206 forinsertion/installation on an SoC 208. Process 200 differs though, fromprocess 100, in that keypair(s) 204 in process 200 are generated by SoC208, whereas in process 100, keypair(s) 104 are generated by CA 102.

In exemplary operation, process 200 begins at step S210, in whichcomponent fabricator 206 initiates key generation onto SoC 208. In atleast one example of step S210, component fabricator 206 furtherinitiates the generation of certificates that may also be encoded ontoSoC 208. In step S212, SoC 208 generates one or more keypairs 204, aswell as the optional certificates. In step S214, SoC 208 exportsgenerated keypair(s) 204 and optional certificates to a computer system(not shown) of component fabricator 206 for recording into a memorythereof (also not shown). In at least one example of step S214, alongwith the exported keypair(s) 204 and certificates, the computer systemmemory of component fabricator 206 further includes manufacturingidentification data relevant to SoC 208, including one or more of thebatch numbers, the manufacturing date, as well as SoC status data. Instep S216, component fabricator 206 advises CA 202 of any public keys(and optional certificates) for the keypair(s) 204 generated by SoC 208.In at least one example of step S216, along with the public keys andcertificates, component fabricator 206 further communicates to CA 202SoC status data, and optionally identifying information of componentfabricator 206 (e.g., a digitally signed hash, etc.).

FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of registration ecosystem 300 forimplementing process 100, FIG. 1 and/or process 200, FIG. 2. In theexemplary embodiment, ecosystem 300 includes elements common toprocesses 100 and 200, such as a CA 302, one or more generated keypairs304 for transfer to a device manufacturer or integrator 306, and an SoC308. In the exemplary embodiment, device manufacturer 306 is thefabricator of SoC 308. Alternatively, device manufacturer 306 functionsto integrate SoC 308 as a previously-manufactured component from aseparate component fabricator, and CA 302 is advised of generated publickeys/certificates by either of the separate component fabricator (e.g.,component fabricators 106, 206) and manufacturer 306. In the exemplaryembodiment, ecosystem 300 further includes an electronic device 310,into which SoC 308 is assembled and/or integrated, and a consumer 312.Also in the exemplary embodiment, CA 302 includes one or more of an OCSPresponder 314, a certificate database 316, and a CRM 318.

In exemplary operation of ecosystem 300, an exemplary PKI activation andvalidation process begins at step S320. In step S320, manufacturer 306assembles device 310, including SoC 308 having one or more keypairs304/certificates inserted into SoC 308 according to process 100 orprocess 200. In at least one example of process 300, step S320 includesa substep in which manufacturer 306 ships device 310 to a merchant,retailer, or distributor (not shown) from which device 310 may beobtained and/or purchased by consumer 312. In step S322, device 310 isobtained/purchased by consumer 312, and in step S324, the consumeractivates and/or onboards device 310. In some examples of step S324,consumer 312 activates/onboards device 310 directly through device 310.In other examples of step S324, activation/onboarding is performedthrough a graphical user interface (not shown) of a computing device(e.g., personal computer, tablet, smart phone, etc.—also not shown)associated with consumer 312.

In step S326, validation of one or more keypairs 304 (and certificates)is performed with CA 302. In the exemplary embodiment, thekeypair/certificate validation of step S326 is performed during theactivation/onboarding subprocess performed in step S324. In one exampleof step S326, an OCSP request message from device 310/SoC 308 to OCSPresponder 314 is transmitted during the keypair/certificate validation.In another example of step S326, a specially formatted call is made toOCSP responder 314 during the keypair/certificate validation.

In step S328, OCSP responder 314 triggers a data capture mechanism of CA302 to (i) capture registration data related to theactivation/onboarding of device 310, the device manufacturingidentification/status data, and the SoC/status data, and (ii) record thecaptured data into certificate database 316. In the exemplaryembodiment, the registration data includes the date/time of registrationand optionally user information, including without limitation, the name,address, email, phone number, or other contact information associatedwith consumer 312 (or another appropriate user). Also in the exemplaryembodiment, the manufacturing identification data of device 310 mayinclude, without limitation, the device serial number, the device batchnumber, the date of assembly, and/or other information identifyingmanufacturer 306, and the device status data may include encoded datareflecting the status of device 310, such as “onboard,” “ready for use,”“in use,” “associated” (e.g., with consumer 312), “disassociated,”“recycled/reprovisioned,” “expired,” etc. For example, some electronicdevices 310 may be preliminarily provisioned or onboarded bymanufacturer 306, but not yet associated with or activated by consumer312. The present embodiments thus advantageously enable manufacturers torender devices into such interim or partial status conditions withoutincurring PKI costs until devices are fully activated by consumers.

In the exemplary embodiment, the data capture mechanism represents amodification to OCSP responder 314 that renders additional capabilitythereto. In one example of ecosystem 300, new and unique coding isprovided inside OCSP responder 314 to enable the additional data captureand/or aggregation capabilities, without separate modifications to theprotocol. In an alternative embodiment, the data capture mechanism is aseparate hardware unit or software coding/subroutine within CA 302 thatis in operable communication with OCSP responder 314 and certificatedatabase 316, or the respective coding therein. Certificate database 316may represent a single memory or storage unit, or may be a plurality ofstorage databases managed and/or cross-referenced by CA 302.

In step S330, the validation, activation, and registration data storedwithin certificate database 316 is aggregated into a billing system ofCRM 318 by an aggregation mechanism thereof. In the exemplaryembodiment, the aggregation mechanism represents a modification to CRM318. In an alternative embodiment, the aggregation mechanism is aseparate hardware unit or software subroutine/database within CA 302that is in operable communication with certificate database 316 and CRM318. In at least one example of step S330, the aggregation mechanismutilizes a table that securely associates respective public keys,digital signatures, certificate revocation statuses, registration data,validation data, and/or activation data together for appropriateinvoicing by CRM 318. According to this advantageous configuration, anovel coupling of the OCSP to the backend processes is achieved. In theexemplary embodiment, new coding within OCSP responder 314 is providedto create a backchannel to CRM 318.

In step S332, CRM 318 automatically assembles an invoice fortransmission to manufacturer 306 for the individual devices 310 thathave been activated by respective consumers 312, with respect toecosystem 300, during an invoice period. In at least one example of stepS332, certificate authority 302 manages more than one PKI, and theassembled invoice includes billing information for activations ofparticular devices 310 with respect to more than one PKI ecosystemmanaged by CA 302. In some embodiments, CRM 318 and/or the invoiceassembled in step S332 include manual processing. The assembled invoicemay be transmitted to manufacturer 306 as a digital or paper billinginvoice, or may represent an automated virtual online financialtransaction.

The exemplary systems and methods described and illustrated hereintherefore significantly increase the commercial value of PKIimplementation for technology industries and individual customers. Asdescribed herein, all desired credentials can be made available in (orgenerated by) the SoC that becomes part of the PKI-deployed device.Customers need not individually obtain credentials for each ecosystem inwhich the customer seeks to subsequently associate a purchased device.Additionally, the CA that issues and manages the certificates need notcharge for the use of the certificates unless the device is lateractually installed (i.e., presuming a purchase), and the PKI for thepre-inserted keys and/or certificates is validated according to theseadvantageous techniques, the bill of materials risk to themanufacturer/integrator is eliminated, or at least significantlyattenuated (as well as the associated guesswork).

Accordingly, where manufacturers/integrators may be unwilling topurchase keys for every manufactured device under conventional schemes(irrespective of whether the device is actually purchased, or sits on ashelf in a warehouse), the same manufacturers/integrators would bewilling to pay a PKI fee for only those devices which our actually usedunder the present systems and methods. Therefore, the presentembodiments function to significantly reduce the cost of implementingPKI in a variety of technology industries, while also increasing thesecurity of the number of integrated devices from this expanded PKIdesirability. It is presently estimated, for example, that the number ofIoT-connected devices is over 8 billion. The number of such deployeddevices is expected to increase to over 20 billion within a few years,and to over 50 billion over the next decade. The cost savings andincreased security resulting from the present embodiments is thereforeconsiderably advantageous.

The present systems and methods also further allow a manufacturer toassemble or prepare a single device that is pre-configured (e.g., keysand certificates available on the SoC at the time of manufacture) tooperate within multiple anticipated ecosystems, where each ecosystem hasits own PKI. Under such configurations, the manufacturer would onlyexpect to pay for the keys/certificates within the device that arerelated to the PKI in which the device is actually deployed. Asdescribed above, these novel techniques are of particular value to IoTdevice manufacturers who desire to have devices deployable within avariety of ecosystems, such as OCF, AllSeen/AllJoyn, Nest/Thread,Zigbee. Such devices are thus readily available for deployment in any ofthe anticipated ecosystems, but the manufacturer will only pay for thosein which the device is actually deployed, thereby realizing significantsavings in the overall manufacturing costs of such devices.

Exemplary embodiments of PKI management systems and methods aredescribed above in detail, as well as particular embodiments relating toOCSP validation techniques that trigger post hoc device registrationswith the PKI. The systems and methods of this disclosure though, are notlimited to only the specific embodiments described herein, but rather,the components and/or steps of their implementation may be utilizedindependently and separately from other components and/or stepsdescribed herein.

Although specific features of various embodiments of the disclosure maybe shown in some drawings and not in others, this convention is forconvenience purposes and ease of description only. In accordance withthe principles of the disclosure, a particular feature shown in adrawing may be referenced and/or claimed in combination with features ofthe other drawings.

Some embodiments involve the use of one or more electronic or computingdevices. Such devices typically include a processor or controller, suchas a general purpose central processing unit (CPU), a graphicsprocessing unit (GPU), a microcontroller, a reduced instruction setcomputer (RISC) processor, an application specific integrated circuit(ASIC), a programmable logic circuit (PLC), a field programmable gatearray (FPGA), a digital signal processing (DSP) device, and/or any othercircuit or processor capable of executing the functions describedherein. The processes described herein may be encoded as executableinstructions embodied in a computer readable medium, including, withoutlimitation, a storage device and/or a memory device. Such instructions,when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform at least aportion of the methods described herein. The above examples areexemplary only, and thus are not intended to limit in any way thedefinition and/or meaning of the term “processor.”

This written description uses examples to disclose the embodiments,including the best mode, and also to enable any person skilled in theart to practice the embodiments, including making and using any devicesor systems and performing any incorporated methods. The patentable scopeof the disclosure is defined by the claims, and may include otherexamples that occur to those skilled in the art. Such other examples areintended to be within the scope of the claims if they have structuralelements that do not differ from the literal language of the claims, orif they include equivalent structural elements with insubstantialdifferences from the literal language of the claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for managing a post-hoc device registration in a first public key infrastructure (PKI) ecosystem in which the device is deployed, the method comprising the steps of: assembling an electronic device having a system-on-a-chip (SoC) integrated therein, wherein the SoC includes a first keypair corresponding to the first PKI ecosystem and a second keypair corresponding to a second PKI ecosystem different from the first PKI ecosystem; sharing, with a certificate authority (CA) associated with the first and second PKI ecosystems, a first communication including the first and second keypairs; activating or onboarding the electronic device for use within the first PKI ecosystem, wherein the step of activating includes a capture of user registration data; receiving, at the CA from the activated electronic device the CA, a second communication containing the first keypair; validating, from the CA to the device, the first keypair to create first validation data; triggering, by the CA, data capture of the first validation data, the first validation data including the user registration data, and data relevant to the manufacture and status of at least one of the electronic device and the SoC; storing the captured first validation data in a database of the CA; and aggregating the stored first validation data, along with the received first keypair, from the CA database, into a first billing invoice to the device assembler, wherein the first billing invoice does not include the second keypair or second validation data relating to the second keypair, and wherein the user registration data is referenced to the first keypair and ether the first validation data by the CA.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of assembling comprises a substep of generating, from the CA, the first and second keypairs.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of assembling comprises a substep of generating, from the SoC, the first and second keypairs.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of validating occurs at the same time as activating/onboarding.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of triggering is performed by an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder of the CA.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the step of validating includes an OCSP request message received by the OCSP responder and an OCSP response message returned by the OCSP responder.
 7. The method of claim 1, further comprising a step of assembling the first billing invoice from the CA to a manufacturer computer system associated with the manufacturer assembly system, based on the aggregated first validation data, wherein the step of assembling is performed by one or more of an automatic process and a manual process.
 8. The method of claim 7, wherein the assembled billing invoice includes payment statements for only those electronic devices that were actually activated since a previous billing cycle or period.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of validation is further performed with respect to the second keypair for the electronic device activated for use within the second PKI ecosystem, wherein the step of storing further includes storing captured second validation data for the second keypair in the CA database, and wherein the step of aggregating includes aggregating the stored first and second validation data, along with the received second keypair into a second billing invoice to the device assembler, whereby (i) validation of the second keypair and storing of the second validation data enables the electronic device to deploy within the second PKI ecosystem but not the first PKI ecosystem, and (ii) deployment of the electronic device within the second PKI ecosystem incurs a PKI activation cost to the device assembler on the second billing invoice with respect to the second PKI ecosystem but not an additional PKI activation cost with respect to the first PKI ecosystem.
 10. A system for managing a public key infrastructure (PKI), comprising: a fabrication subsystem configured to fabricate a system-on-a-chip (SoC) having a plurality of PKI keypairs encoded therein including a first PKI keypair and a second PKI keypair; a manufacturer assembly subsystem configured to integrate the fabricated SoC into a manufactured electronic device including the fabricated SoC as in integrated SoC; an assembled electronic device including the integrated SoC and the plurality of PM keypairs encoded therein; and a certificate authority (CA) server subsystem in operable communication with a fabricator computer subsystem of the fabrication subsystem, a manufacturer computer subsystem of the manufacturer assembly subsystem, and the assembled electronic device, the CA server subsystem being configured to (i) validate the first PKI keypair upon activation of the assembled electronic device within a first PM ecosystem, and (ii) store first captured data related to the activation of the assembled electronic device within the first PKI ecosystem, the first captured data including one or more of a device registration, a device manufacture, a device status, an SoC status, and an SoC registration, wherein the first and second PKI keypairs represent at least two different PKI ecosystems, respectively, having two different PKIs, and wherein activation of the assembled electronic device within the first PKI ecosystem does not activate the assembled electronic device within the second PKI ecosystem.
 11. The ecosystem system of claim 10, wherein one of the SoC and the CA is further configured to generate at least one digital certificate along with the first keypair.
 12. The system of claim 10, wherein the SoC is configured to generate the first PKI keypair from the fabricated SoC.
 13. The system of claim 10, wherein the CA is configured to generate the first PKI keypair for installation on, or encoding within, the fabricated SoC.
 14. The system of claim 10, wherein the CA further comprises: an online certificate status provider (OCSP) configured to receive an OCSP request message from the assembled electronic device, wherein the OCSP request message includes at least one a public key of the first keypair encoded on the integrated SoC; a data capture unit configured to capture one or more of the encoded public key of the first PKI keypair from the integrated SoC, customer registration information, device manufacture and device status data, fabricated and integrated SoC manufacturing data, and integrated SoC status data; a certificate database configured to store captured data for one or more of the plurality of PKI keypairs, certificates, customer registration information, fabricated and/or integrated SoC manufacture and status, and device manufacture and status; an aggregation unit for aggregating the stored captured data from the certificate database into a billing statement; and a customer relations management unit configured to receive the aggregated statement and generate therefrom an invoice to a particular manufacturer computer subsystem reflecting only the PKI-enabled devices, made by the manufacturer assembly subsystem associated with the particular manufacturer computer subsystem, that were activated within an activation time period for use within a particular PKI ecosystem associated with the first PKI keypair.
 15. The system of claim 10, wherein the data capture mechanism is one of a part of the OCSP responder and a separate unit within the CA.
 16. The system of claim 10, wherein the aggregation mechanism is one of (i) a part of a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) unit within the CA, and (ii) a separate unit within the CA.
 17. The system of claim 10, wherein the OCSP triggers the data capture mechanism upon receiving an OCSP request message.
 18. The system of claim 10, wherein OCSP is further configured to not transmit to the assembled electronic device (i) a first OCSP reply message until after the validation and registration of the assembled electronic device for use within the first PKI ecosystem associated with the first PKI keypair, including a status of the assembled electronic device, has been confirmed by the OCSP, or (ii) a second OCSP reply message until after a separate validation and registration of the assembled electronic device for use within the second PKI ecosystem associated with the second PKI keypair.
 19. The system of claim 10, wherein the CA server subsystem is further configured to (i) validate the second PKI keypair upon activation of the assembled electronic device within the second PKI ecosystem, and (ii) store second captured data related to the activation of the assembled electronic device within the second PKI ecosystem separate from the assembled electronic device being activated in the first PKI ecosystem, wherein the second captured data includes one or more of a device registration, a device manufacture, a device status, an SoC status, and an SoC registration. 